Commentary on Plumer & Olson by Woods, John
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 7 
Jun 6th, 9:00 AM - Jun 9th, 5:00 PM 
Commentary on Plumer & Olson 
John Woods 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Woods, John, "Commentary on Plumer & Olson" (2007). OSSA Conference Archive. 121. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA7/papersandcommentaries/121 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at 
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized 
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca. 
 
Woods, J. (2007). Commentary on Gilbert Plumer and Kenneth Olson: “Reasoning from conflicting 
sources.” In H.V. Hansen, et. al. (Eds.), Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground, CD-ROM (pp. 
1-5). Windsor, ON: OSSA. 
Copyright © 2007, the author. 
                                                
Commentary on Gilbert Plumer and Kenneth Olson: “Reasoning 
from Conflicting Sources” 
 
JOHN WOODS 
 
Department of Philosophy 
University of British Columbia 
1866 Main Mall, Vancouver BC 
Canada 
jhwoods@interchange.ubc.ca 
woodsj@dcs.kcl.ac.uk 
 
 
In this most interesting paper, Gilbert Plumer and Kenneth Olson have set themselves an 
important task. They want to know whether there is a way of determining when, if at all, 
reasoning from inconsistent information is “allowed”. Two different approaches to 
reasoning flow from the answers to this question. If the answer is Yes, then the reasoning 
is paraconsistentist. If the answer is No, then the reasoning is consistentist. Plumer and 
Olson favour the consistentist option, but only after having given the paraconsistentist 
alternative careful and generally well-informed attention. In the remarks to follow, I shall 
first consider the grounds for the authors’ rejection of paraconsistentism. I shall then offer 
some very brief thoughts about how they deal with the consistentist option. 
 
PARACONSISTENCY 
 
Plumer and Olson consider two versions of paraconsistency. One is dialetheism and the 
other is defeasibilism.1 Dialetheism is the doctrine that some contradictions are true, that 
is, both true and false classically speaking. Dialetheism generates two difficult problems. 
One is to make a convincing case for true contradictions. The other is to show that it is 
less costly to retain intuitive theories afflicted with internal inconsistencies than to 
develop consistent but non-intuitive alternatives. Defeasible logics are also met with 
challenges. Perhaps the core issue is best set out as follows. Consider the following (true) 
claims which constitute what I’ll call the defeasibility knot. 
 
1. Birds fly 
2. Penguins don’t fly 
3. Tweety is a bird 
4. Tweety is a penguin 
 
 
1 Plumer and Olson nowhere expressly categorize defeasible reasoning as paraconsistent, and certainly 
defeasible reasoning is not usually what is discussed in the literature under this heading. Even so, defeasible 
reasoning is paraconsistent. If a data-base contains inconsistent information, defeasible inferences 
therefrom fail to honour ex falso quodlibet. This suffices for (weak) paraconsistency. See below. As Plumer 
and Olson themselves point out, “… defeasibility logic has also been proposed as an alternative to classical 
deductive logic for dealing with inconsistent information.” (p. 4) 
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It follows from these that 
 
5. Tweety flies and does not fly. 
 
Hence, by reductio, the above four sentences are inconsistent. But how can this be if they 
are all true? Let us consider these difficulties in order. 
 
DIALETHEISM 
 
The fundamental fact for dialetheists is the failure of ex falso quodlibet, that is, the 
theorem that contradictions logically imply every statement whatever. Why do they think 
it fails? Some logicians distinguish between the consequences that a set of sentences has, 
and the consequences that it would be necessary (or appropriate) for someone to draw. 
This distinction leaves it open that ex falso is true of the consequences that a 
contradiction has, yet false of the consequences that should be drawn from it. If we 
wished to emphasize this distinction, we could put it that consequence-having is classical 
and consequence-drawing is paraconsistent. 
 Paraconsistentists reject this suggestion. What is to be gained, they ask, by having 
consequences that can never be properly drawn? Besides, since paraconsistency is 
already well-embedded in this distinction, the more economical thing to do is to close the 
gap between having and drawing, and go whole hog with paraconsistency. 
 We are now well-placed to make the basic case for dialetheism. The standard or 
classical fix on ex falso is that if an inconsistency holds in a theory, the theory blows 
apart. This is the catastrophe thesis. Of course, the job of any theory is to distinguish in a 
principled way between its true and untrue sentences. But if ex falso were true, then no 
inconsistent theory could do its job, since the distinction between true and untrue 
sentences would now have collapsed. Accordingly, inconsistency is a catastrophe for any 
theory afflicted by it. 
Plumer and Olson rightly point out historical examples of inconsistent theories 
that didn’t comport with the catastrophe thesis. Old quantum theory is one. Intuitive set 
theory is another. To this we might add a third – calculus before the discovery of limits 
and, later, of the hyperreals. No one seriously thinks that the presence of these 
inconsistencies made it impossible for Bohr, Frege, and Newton and Leibniz to generate a 
good deal of solid theoretical insight into electrons, classes and infinitesmals. So, whether 
we like it or not, the reasoning in those cases was inescapably and irreducibly 
paraconsistent. Since paraconsistentists already hold that the distinction between classical 
consequence-having and paraconsistent consequence-drawing is more trouble than it’s 
worth, their view about these productive but inconsistent theories is that ex falso simply 
fails in them (and that Frege’s and Russell’s reaction to the inconsistency of classes was 
quite mad). 
 Now here’s the dialetheic rub ([Woods, 2005]). If a theory’s telos is left 
undisturbed by a provable inconsistency in it, if the presence of the inconsistency is not 
catastrophic, why should its truth be anything to get lathered up about? Thus the 
absolutely foundational insight for dialetheists is that true inconsistencies are no more 
catastrophic than provable inconsistencies. And since provable inconsistencies aren’t 
catastrophic at all, neither are true ones.  
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 So far so good. We’ve been able to show that true contradictions wouldn’t be 
awful. But this is a long way from showing that they would do us some real good. The 
good that dialetheists think that they do us are theories restored to intuitiveness by the 
reinstatement of axioms that generates the once-dreaded inconsistencies. Plumer and 
Olson are quite right to observe that, under this option to date, dialetheic set theory and 
dialetheic semantics haven’t attained anything like the productivity of their consistent 
rivals. 
 Even so, I can’t help thinking that dialetheism is largely irrelevant to our question, 
which is, to repeat, whether it is ever sound policy to reason from inconsistent 
information, irrespective of whether the inconsistency is true. In this I think we would be 
better served by consulting paraconsistent logics that aren’t dialetheic. Ray Jennings, 
Peter Schotch and Bryson Brown have done good work on preservationist logics 
([Jennings and Schotch, 1984], [Schotch and Jennings, 1989], [Brown, 1999], [Brown, 
2004]), as have Dederick Batens, Joke Meheus and their colleagues on adaptive logics. 
([Batens et al., 2000]). 
 
DEFEASIBILISM 
 
If I were czar, I would place a ten-year moratorium on Tweety. Tweety reminds us that 
some generalizations are not universally quantified conditional sentences, but rather are 
generalizations of a sort that can tolerate (certain numbers and kinds of) true negative 
instances. Such generalizations are called “generic”. A principal task is to specify truth 
(or, more pointedly, falsity) conditions for generic claims. The Tweety case reminds us 
that there can be two true generic claims, each truly instantiated by Tweety, whose 
respective consequents are inconsistent with one another. Thus defeasible reasoning is 
not reasoning from inconsistencies but reasoning to them. Part of what is so odd about the 
Tweety line of reasoning is that, although it leads to an inconsistent conclusion, it doesn’t 
sanction reduction, as we’ve already said. So there are consistent premiss-sets which 
(non-classically) imply inconsistent conclusions. 
If this sounds wrong, let us remind ourselves that it simply mimics what might be 
called the primary semantic fact about true generic claims: There are false instantiations 
for which they remain true. Modus tollens fails in such contexts.  
Of course, if we decided to add the conclusion of the Tweety demonstration to our 
knowledge-set or data-base, any further reasonings from this source would have to be 
paraconsistent. Suppose – contrary to fact – that the inconsistency weren’t dissolved. 
Then these further reasonings would indeed be paraconsistent, but they needn’t be 
defeasible. 
 This gives us reason to think that defeasibilism is not intended as a species of 
paraconsistentism. A further reason is evident in the way in which the Tweety 
inconsistency is actually handled. It is dissolved. No one thinks that Tweety can fly. 
Although birds fly, Tweety is one of those birds that can’t. He is a penguin. 
Let me try to sum up this brief review of the paraconsistentist option. 
1. Although there is clearly a distinction between consequence-having and 
consequence-drawing, it is not all obvious that it is a distinction that calls out 
for paraconsistentism in the second instance (which it does) and classicality in 
the former (which it might not). 
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2. If this is right, then it is not obvious that ex falso holds for consequence-
having; hence it is not obvious that paraconsistency is not the best general 
strategy. 
3. In any event, dialetheism is not the decisive issue for paraconsistentism. 
 
CONSISTENTISM 
 
It remains, then, to say something about the authors’ support of the consistentist 
alternative. Here the basic idea is that whenever one is faced with an inconsistency in a 
data-base, reasoning from it must await its removal. It is regrettable that time doesn’t 
allow for much discussion of the various procedures for the restoration of consistency 
canvassed by Plumer and Olson. So I’ll make a couple of rather more general points 
instead. 
First, in its weakest and most widely accepted form, paraconsistentism is simply 
the doctrine that ex falso fails for consequence-drawing. In a stronger version, it is the 
doctrine that ex falso fails for consequence-having. But neither in its weak form nor in its 
stronger is there the slightest discouragement of the generic imperative that people should 
reason consistentistly whenever they can. Neither is there any reason to doubt that when 
faced with an inconsistency in one’s database, it is good general policy to try to get rid of 
it. Paraconsistentist logiciansare nothing but happy to admit consistentism as a very large 
sublogic of their own. Paraconsistentists are wholly at home with the idea that in the 
general case the best paraconsistent reasoning is consistentist reasoning. This tells us 
something generic importance. It is that when it comes to how one should reason, 
consistentism is hardly a rival of paraconsistentism. 
Secondly, in Plumer and Olson’s hands consistentism is not a strategy for 
reasoning from inconsistent information. Indeed it is not even a strategy for reasoning 
from consistent information. It is a strategy for elimating inconsistency. It is a way of 
making inconsistency go away, so that the question of what to infer from it doesn’t arise. 
Consider now the reasoning required of triers of fact in legal proceedings when faced 
with conflicting testimony. If the main consistentist (and paraconsistentist) impulse is to 
be given sway here, something should be done to eliminate these inconsistencies. Plumer 
and Olson offer some attractive options for achieving these expungements. Let E be any 
corpus of testimony in which such conflicts occur. As Plumer and Olson themselves 
observe with respect to their own option C, E presents a judge or a juror, J, with an 
inconsistency if and only if some subset of E that preserves the inconsistency is believed 
by J or accepted by him. Of course, it’s true, given the constitution of E, that the content 
of what some witnesses have said contradicts the content of what other witnesses have 
said, or of what a given witness himself has attested to earlier. Similarly, when experts 
favour courts with conflicting opinions, the content of what one says contradicts what 
some other expert says. But, although it may be true that witness W says P and witness 
W′ says Q (a contrary of P), that’s no contradiction, hence no occasion for dialetheic or 
even paraconsistent measures. 
What, then, is the inconsistency-problem for J? One might think that it is the task 
of trying to figure out what inferences to draw from E, whether paraconsistently if the 
inconsistency is left in place, or consistentistly if J can manage to get rid of it. But there is 
a prior question that has nothing to do with reasoning, and which, once dealt with, leaves 
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the question of what to infer from E wholly unencumbered by the problem that Plumer 
and Olson are intent on solving. 
No juror is going to believe any inconsistencies embedded in the content of the 
witnesses’ conflicting testimony. The issue is not how I reason from “P and Q”, with Q a 
contrary of P. The issue is which of these, if either, do I believe or should I accept. It is 
interesting to note that there is nothing in the nature of this task that requires the 
deployment of Plumer’s and Olson’s expungement procedures. Rather, in figuring out 
what if anything to accept of E, J’s belief-formation devices and J’s proposition-accepting 
protocols serve to filter inconsistency from J’s belief-set or acceptance-set as a byproduct 
of the general principle that people don’t believe or accept contradictions, except possibly 
in set theory or native semantics. But not in legal proceedings. 
J doesn’t have a reasoning-problem with respect to E. He has a reasoning-problem 
only with respect to what he believes or accepts of E. That is, he has a reasoning-problem 
with respect to E′, a proper subset of E. Since people don’t believe or accept 
inconsistencies, E′ will be inconsistency-free. Now it’s true that J must now try to 
determine what he should (or might) infer from E′. But since E′ is inconsistency-free, 
none of the Plumer and Olson inconsistency-expungement measures is needed here. 
Now I freely concede that what I have just said has the look of Plumer’s and 
Olson’s strategy B, which in turn looks rather like Rescher’s maximal consistent subset 
strategy ([Rescher, 1976]). It is a strategy that tells J to form the largest consistent subset 
of E. True enough, but my point is that this is achieved automatically, by whatever 
devices fix what J believes of E or determine what parts of E he thinks should be 
accepted. Let me repeat that since inconsistencies aren’t believed anyway and aren’t 
found to be acceptable anyway, the inconsistencies in E are filtered out, not by a policy 
for their removal, but by Js quite ordinary belief-formation devices. There is another way 
of saying the same thing. Suppose that J is worried enough to ask, “How in the world am 
I going to eliminate these drat inconsistencies?” What would we tell him? We’d tell him 
not to be such a nervous nelly. We’d tell him simply to determine what of which 
witness’s testimony to believe. The rest takes care of itself. 
 
link to response                                                                                                 link to paper
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